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Abstract
This paper applies a measure of country risk to determine the evolution of credit spreads on
secondary market sovereign bonds issued by emerging countries. After the Mexican
financial crisis in 1995, this market has been characterised by a sharp decline of spreads
which, by mid-1997, brought them to a level which was thought not to adequately cover
risk. The episode has been followed in successive years by a new increase of spreads,
accompanied by high volatility in concomitance with the Asian and Russian crises. In order
to tackle the issue of how spreads are determined, we concentrate on sovereign risk as
measured by spreads on Brady bonds and specify a dynamic panel model including seven
countries that are large issuers of these instruments. The analysis reveals a significant effect
for economic fundamentals, but we also found that spreads are significantly affected by
shock factors: besides general financial crises, we isolated a role for commodity prices. We
found an asymmetric effect for core countries interest rates, which signals the limited role
for core rates in affecting the decline in spreads, that we instead attribute, besides a
bettering of fundamentals, to a spreading of globalisation. In the post ‘97 period we found
spreads grossly in line with fundamentals but we have no specific explanation to offer for
the occurrence of repeated financial crises save that a general recourse to the argument of
interdependence. We think that the analysis of contagion or interdependence problems that
has recently attracted much attention obviously deserves further work and possibly a
different econometric technique using data at a higher frequency than the monthly data
employed in this study.
JEL Classification: C23, F34, G12, G15
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1. THE DETERMINANTS OF EMERGING MARKET SPREADS
In recent years, much attention has been given to the issue of how spreads on emerging
market bonds are determined: the question arises from the observed turmoil in
emerging countries during the second half of the nineties. After the explosion of
spreads in the course of the Mexican financial crisis in 1994-95, a systematic and sharp
reduction of spreads took place during the following years until, by the half of 1997,
they had plunged at levels which were the same or lower than those observed before
the crisis. This decline was so sustained that it induced concern among investors
because it was felt that spreads had perhaps fallen too far. The following episodes,
starting with the Asian crisis in 1997, passing through the Russian in the summer of
1998, until the recent Brazilian troubles at the beginning of 1999, seem to confirm this
suspicion. It is difficult, anyway, to determine what the equilibrium level of the price
of emerging market bonds should be. The question so becomes twofold: on the one
side it implies the need to investigate on the economic determinants that affect the
price - and hence the spread - of emerging country bonds; on the other hand it gives
rise to the issue of which factors forced the spreads to such low levels in those years.
With regard to the first problem, there are several works focusing on it which began to
be published since the beginning of the eighties, and of which we will present a review.
These papers focus on the relation between the price of emerging market debt and
economic fundamentals, with the aim of finding specific variables able to predict
spreads in lending to less developed countries. Besides the endogenous variables
representing macro fundamentals of the economies considered (among these a
significant role is usually found, as an example, for per-capita income, inflation rate
and external or fiscal unbalances), exogenous factors of shock were also considered
when it was thought that they might have an impact on the degree of solvency of the
3country borrower, as for example the interest rates in core economies, or the price of
oil.
Recently, the role of industrialised country interest rates has begun to be examined
with renewed attention; this brings back to the second aspect of the question: the
pronounced narrowing of the spreads in 1995.
Among the variety of explanations that has been proposed, the basic claim reported
from financial observers was that core country interest rates affect the “appetite for
risk” of investors. The idea is that an expansive monetary stance, hence a high level of
global liquidity, may have increased the appetite for riskier investments in those years,
forcing spreads to levels lower to those that adequately cover risk.
Many other interpretations were actually suggested: a first one is the possibility of a
resumption of a longer-term trend toward low levels of emerging credit spreads which
was interrupted by the Tequila crisis in 1995: this trend could reflect, again on the
lenders’ side, the maturing of core financial markets, with improved access to
information, liberalisation of regulatory frameworks regarding specific investor classes
(in particular pension funds), improved risk management capabilities. This general
trend of globalisation would have fostered the supply of lending to emerging markets,
which, on the other hand, were implementing in those years important programs of
stabilisation and structural reform.
In contrast with this market-efficiency claim, other argued the view of possible herding
behaviours which may result as a consequence of the globalisation process, mainly due
to information asymmetries among investors1. Actually, another effect of globalisation
can consist in a reduction of the incentives to incur the costs of acquiring country-
specific information in the asset allocation activity: financial contagion becomes the
“rational” result of an optimal portfolio allocation when securities markets grow and
the costs of acquiring information are “sufficiently” great.
Another hypothesis is related to the claim of a moral hazard problem in lending to
emerging economies, which would be induced by the IMF-led rescue package after the
Tequila crisis which, through the bailing out of the Mexican government, would have
strengthened the incentives for investing in risky markets.
                                                            
1 This issue is tackled for example in Calvo [1]; uninformed investors may incorrectly extract signals from
the informed investor set: in case of negative signalling, they may not discern if this is due to negative
information about markets or because of margin calls of leveraged investors. In this sense, see also
Fernández-Arias [10] for a brief discussion on the role of the hedge funds in the Russian crisis.
4What is generally shared among all the views previously expressed, is the limited role,
from the borrowers’ side, for the evolution in economic fundamentals, which seem to
be overshadowed by the financial events occurred in past years. The volatility of
spreads that followed the Russian crisis, characterised by temporary high peaks
followed by drastic declines, has further highlighted the role of financial contagion or
interdependence and possibly the diminished weight of fundamentals in the market
assessment of country risk.
In the following we analyse data on a set of emerging countries during the years from
1992 to 1999. We solve the problem of measuring the role of fundamentals by
developing a rating index that is constructed, as we explain in the text, as to give a
simplified replication of Moody’s ratings.
Section 2.1 gives a brief survey of the structure of the emerging markets of bonds and
presents the EMBI Index, which refers to the specific class of bonds that we will model
in this analysis. Section 2.2 reviews the literature. Section 3.1 reports, after a
preliminary empirical examination of the time series properties of the aggregate EMBI
spreads, the estimates of a regression equation on the aggregate EMBI time series.
Section 3.2 details the procedure and the macroeconomic variables used to construct
our rating index, and reports the estimates of a disaggregated dynamic panel model for
seven countries that are large issuers of Brady bonds. Section 4 gives some conclusions
and suggestions for further work.
2.1 THE EMERGING BOND MARKETS
The analysis in this paper will be restricted to debt instruments exchanged on the
secondary markets of bonds. The credit spread is defined as the excess yield which a
risky security pays over an industrial country government security2 of the same
currency denomination and maturity: it represents the assessment of the market on the
degree of riskiness associated to the country issuer. We examine secondary market
spreads3 associated to sovereign issues, not focusing on private issues or other forms of
                                                            
2 For floating coupon bonds, the spread is measured over Libor.
3 Secondary market spreads follow different patterns than launch spreads over time: factors that increase
the perception of risk associated to emerging markets debt, while negatively affecting secondary market
spreads, may have opposite effects on first issues because only the low-risk borrowers are left to tap the
market, while riskier borrowers are rationed out. See Eichengreen-Mody [8]and Min [18] for an analysis
on launch spreads; Cline-Barnes [5] and Zhang [22] consider secondary market spreads, the first on a
5lending such as syndicated loans4; we consider the spreads associated to the J.P.
Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI), which is a total return index of U.S.
dollar-denominated Brady bonds and other sovereign restructured bonds.
Chart 1
The EMBI Index is composed of a set of country sub-indexes whose spreads are a
weighted average of those of the instruments included in each country basket; the
weights are given by the capitalisation of the instruments considered.
Brady securities follow the reconstruction of commercial bank loans after the LDCs
debt crisis during the eighties. The first Brady plan, accredited to former U.S. Treasury
Secretary, Nicholas Brady, was launched in Mexico in 1989: the Brady bond market
has then quickly become the largest and most liquid of the emerging fixed-income
markets5. These bonds are usually collateralised by Treasury zero-coupons, hence the
risk they carry blends pure country risk and the zero credit risk of the assets used as
guarantee: sovereign spreads are computed stripping the influence of collaterals to
capture the residual country risk.
                                                                                                                                                                 
pooled sample of emerging markets and industrial countries; Kamin-Kleist [15] conduct a study on both
the kind of issues.
4 See Kamin-Kleist [15] or Cline-Barnes [5] for an exhaustive description of the characteristics of these
markets and the recent evolution of the associated spreads. Eichengreen-Mody [8] examine the differences
in the issuing decision of borrowers and pricing decision of lenders through a sample selection model à la
Heckman for private and non-private borrowers. Durbin-Ng [6] study the correlation between secondary
sovereign spreads and secondary corporate spreads to test the “sovereign ceiling” rule that no corporate
debt should be better rated than that of the home government.
5 For a more detailed historical perspective on Brady bonds and a description of their basic features see
EMTA [9].
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6To date Brady bonds are not, anyway, fully representative of the market: in the first
place their quote on the total secondary market has been reducing since the beginning
of the ‘90s; on the other hand the countries issuing bonds in more recent years are
generally better rated than the countries that issued Brady bonds and, as a consequence
of being perceived as riskier instruments, the evolution of the related spreads can be
different from that of other international bond classes. Differences in the spreads’
dynamics can also be attributed to the fact that they generally have longer tenors than
Eurobonds or Global bonds; in addition, the collateralisation may be not well perceived
by investors for the transaction costs that it induces: for all these reasons the EMBI
spread cannot be considered as fully representative of the cost of financing of the
whole of emerging countries6.
Chart 2
The EMBI Global, published by J.P. Morgan since 1999, is based on a broader
country set than that of the EMBI; it adds to Brady bonds other classes of
instruments such as Eurobonds, traded loans and local market securities.
The selection of the EMBI Index is motivated by the fact that its spread is the only
readily available synthetic measure of spread for each country – associated to the
average maturity of each country/sub-index – over a sufficiently long span of years.
Tracking individual bond spreads implies the need of verifying that they satisfy
                                                            
6See Kamin-Kleist [15], page 4-6. As countries go through the process of structural reform and the
perception of their sovereign credit improves, Brady bonds are expected to eventually be replaced by debt
which is cheaper to fund, or repurchased.
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7conditions of sufficient liquidity, so as to obtain fair prices of the bonds considered; the
tendency of spreads to decline as bonds approach maturity may represent another
source of bias toward measuring spreads over time. Furthermore, and to conclude,
Brady bond spreads represent anyway an homogeneous class — the low-credit rating
one — of emerging market bonds.
2.2 PAST STUDIES
Interest in the pricing of emerging country bonds, as opposed to bank loans, was
revived by Edwards [7] in the aftermath of the international debt crisis erupted in 1982.
Major concern of this paper was the difference in behaviour between bonds and loans,
based on the conjecture that bond spreads may reflect risk more accurately than loans,
due to the syndicated nature of the latter as opposed to dispersed nature of holders of
the former7. In the above paper Edwards developed a model that can be regarded as the
model conventionally followed by many authors for the determination of the spreads in
the case of risk-neutral lender. Let’s write with Edwards
( ) ( )[ ] ( )** 111 isip +=++- ,
where i* is the international risk-free rate, s the spread and  p the probability of default,
possibly a linear function of some macroeconomic indicators xi; we can then derive the
regression equation
( ) ( ) uxis ii +++= å b*1loglog ,
that has been used by Edwards and many others as a basis for the specification of
models for spreads. The main finding of his analysis was to indicate in the debt-output
ratio and in the investment-GNP ratio the two major determinant of the spreads, the
former negative and the latter positive. On the other hand Edwards did not find
significant differences in the determinants of both loans and bonds.
                                                            
7 In the case of crisis, bondholders would have no other choice than declare default, while banks should
usually be able to reschedule the payments. Without entering deeply into the problem, Miller-Zhang [17]
show how the lack of coordination among bondholders, not covered by Paris or London clubs, may induce
moral hazard both on the lenders’ side, in case of IMF bailing out of borrowers in trouble, and on the
debtors’ side, in case of authorized payment standstill. The two events have potential heavy repercussions
of opposite sign on the price of bonds.
8The basic approach set forth by Edwards has been followed in the ’90s by a number of
authors that we briefly examine.
Cantor and Packer [4] examined the relationship between the sovereign credit ratings
assigned by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 8 and the secondary market spreads on
sovereign bonds, issued by both developed and developing countries, through a cross-
section regression analysis. In a first equation they put a set of macroeconomic
variables as regressors for the spreads, finding an important role for the per capita
income, inflation and the external debt-exports ratio; when the credit rating variable is
added to the equation none of the economic variables remains statistically significant:
the authors conclude stressing the ability of credit ratings to provide the market with
information about country risk which goes beyond that available in public macro data9.
Cline and Barnes[5] used a pool of 11 emerging market bonds and 6 industrial country
bonds, over the period 1992-96, to estimate a model of secondary market spreads based
on the fundamentals of the countries considered: they pointed out strong significance
for the external debt-exports ratio, followed by the international reserves-imports ratio
and the inflation rate. The sharp decline of emerging market spreads during the period
1995-97 exceeds what could be explained by the macroeconomic performance of the
emerging markets in question: the authors ascribe the phenomenon to the supply-side
forces which have arisen in recent years in the international capital markets.
Eichengreen and Mody [8] conducted a study on launch spreads of about a thousand
developing-country bonds over the period 1991-96: they paid special attention to the
problem of sample selection bias associated to the borrowers’ issuing decision; they
considered both the issuing decision of debtors and the pricing decision of the investors
in an à la Heckman model where they are treated simultaneously. They also tested the
impact on the behaviour of the spreads over time of shifts in market sentiment toward
emerging markets: they found that the variation in spreads in 1995-97 seems to be
                                                            
8 See Cantor-Packer [3] for a survey of the historical and the institutional aspects of the ratings industry.
9 Other papers which focus on the interaction between sovereign credit ratings and market spreads are the
more recent Reisen and von Maltzan [21] and Larrain, Reisen and von Maltzan [16]: through a Granger-
causality test they discuss whether the rating of the agencies lead or lag markets with respect to sovereign
risk. Their findings lead to a cautious conclusion about the existence of an independent long-run impact of
credit ratings on the markets assessment of country risk: anyway they find a significant announcement
effect in case of a put on review (in particular if the outlook is negative) by the rating agencies. This
makes them suggest a favourable policy conclusion about the ability of the rating industry in dampening
excessive capital flows into the emerging markets.
9dominated more by arbitrary shifts in pricing behaviour10, originated by good liquidity
conditions in core markets, than by a better performance of the systems considered
during that period.
Min  [18] examines the primary market of a sample of about 500 issues of Asian and
Latin American countries from 1991 to 1995: inflation rate, debt-GDP ratio and
reserves-GDP ratio result as the most relevant variables for predicting the evolution of
the spreads. Special attention is given to the analysis of external shocks as measured by
the real oil price and the international interest rates, as proxied by the 3-month US
Treasury Bill rate: both variables  were found to be scarcely significant.
Kamin and Kleist [15] estimate a panel data model, over the period 1991-97, on about
a thousand launch spreads on new bond issues and new bank loans: by exploiting the
evidence of Cantor and Packer[4]’s analysis, they use the ratings assigned by Moody’s
and Standard & Poor’s to new loan and bond issues as measures of country risk in the
place of fundamentals. They test the significance of industrial country rates in the
determination of the spreads, considering both the primary and the secondary market:
the result points to a little role for industrial rates of United States, Germany and Japan
in explaining the spreads’ dynamics. The authors qualify the phenomenon of falling
spreads after 1995 more as a consequence of the increased financial globalisation over
the course of the beginning of the nineties, trend halted by the Mexican crisis but taken
up after its dissipation.
Zhang [22]’s work, based on a panel of eight Eurobonds and Brady bonds of
developing countries from 1992 to 1997, discusses the issue of a possible moral hazard
in lending to emerging markets during the nineties, induced by the large official
support program in Mexico during 1995, which would have taken to overlending to
emerging markets in the successive years and to the observed pronounced decline in
spreads after that crisis. Zhang tests the moral hazard hypothesis inserting the spreads
on B-rated US corporates among the usual economic explanatory variables: the
evidence of a positive correlation between the two variables and the similar declining
                                                            
10 Calvo and Mendoza [2] explain why, in globalised securities markets, investors can be incentivated to
imitate arbitrary “market” portfolios: the herding behaviour can “rationally” be the result of optimal
portfolio diversification when securities markets grow in the presence of information costs.
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pattern during 1996-97 showed by corporate spreads would not support the moral
hazard claim11.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this paragraph we will examine empirically the relationship between spreads,
fundamentals and international short term rates as suggested by the existing literature.
3.1 A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF THE EMBI
SPREADS
The behaviour of the aggregate EMBI spreads is highly erratic over the entire sample
considered in this analysis (1992.01 1999.10). Their higher volatility with respect to
most other measures of credit spreads (loans and bonds) that have been produced (see
Kamin and von Kleist [15]) is explained by the fact that they represent the low-rating
class of emerging market bonds.
As in previous studies we chose to model the logarithm of the spread over the risk-free
rate and on a measure of country creditworthiness plus dummies to reflect special
events. Before presenting such regression analysis at the disaggregated level we wish
to examine some properties of the aggregate time series.
Formal unit root tests indicate that the spread appears in the sample as an I(1) variable.
ADF with a constant and six lags gives:
ADF Test Statistic -1.669 1%   Critical Value* -3.507
5%   Critical Value -2.895
10% Critical Value -2.584
and similar results can be obtained with the Phillips-Perron test.
We decided not to take at face value the above sample information but rather to
interpret it as the need to include in the empirical analysis appropriate dummy
variables to reflect the presence of  aberrant observations12. The spreads are in fact
obviously affected by the numerous financial crises that have troubled the ’90s, starting
with the Mexican crisis of 1995. We treat the effect of crises as innovation outliers (see
Box 1).
                                                            
11 See Miller-Zhang [17] for a more detailed discussion of the issue.
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The interpretation of crises as innovation outliers can be appraised by inspection of
Chart 3, in which we plot the behaviour of the spreads together with the timing of the
four major crises that  have occurred in the nineties. If  we insert a dummy variable that
takes values of 1 at the dates indicated by the above graph, the simple DF statistics
rises to -2.76, which is indicative of the size of the effects that particular observations
have on the test. Coherently with the results of the Montecarlo experiment reported in
Box 1 we have retained the above dummy variable named CRISIS in all following
analyses.
The majority of the studies previously presented, based on a shorter sample than ours,
have concentrated on the explanation of the fall of spreads following the Mexican
crisis. The basic explanation put forward by market observers was to be looked in the
rather low credit rates prevailing in advanced economies. After looking for the
evidence that short term interest rates in industrial country affect spreads on emerging
market bonds (Brady bonds included), a quite general result of the above studies was
                                                                                                                                                                 
12 The Jarque-Bera statistics for the first difference of the logs takes the value 47.95 with SK=1.3 and
K=5.44 thus confirming the presence of aberrant observations.
BOX 1
A simulation experiment to assess the impact of IO on DF statistic
Neglected innovation outliers will not generally have large effects on the estimated coefficients of an
ARMA process (see Franses [12]); they have however some effect in making it difficult for near unit root
processes to be properly assessed. On the other hand it is possible to show that taking care of the i.o. with
an appropriate dummy produces estimates that converge to the true value as the size of the i.o. increases.
At the same time the ADF statistic (including the dummy) will uniformly increase. To show such an
effect we report in the table below the result of a simulated experiment.
The generating process is:
yt=0.9*yt(-1)+ut+w*iot (t=50), t=2,100, ut=N(0,1), y1=0,
w takes values 1,2,3,...,10.
Dependent var. is
D(yt)
Test equation is D(yt)=c1+c2 ´ yt(-1)+c3 ´ D(yt(-1))+ut+w ´ iot (t=50)
Average of 20 replications
w c2 se_c2 t_c2
 1  0.86  0.06 -2.59
 2  0.86  0.06 -2.60
 3  0.86  0.07 -2.64
 4  0.86  0.07 -2.68
 5  0.87  0.07 -2.74
 6  0.87  0.07 -2.81
 7  0.87  0.07 -2.90
 8  0.88  0.07 -2.99
 9  0.88  0.06 -3.09
 10  0.88  0.06 -3.20
The table is self illuminating. Note that for true unit root processes the ADF will be little affected and the
AR parameter will go to one.
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the finding of a little role for them. On the contrary, by looking at a longer period that
includes another rise in the post-98 period, we find significant effects for the US short
term rate, as measured by the 3-month Fed Funds rate.
Chart 3
The following equations simply illustrate the result for the aggregate EMBI. In the first
equation we regress the first difference of log spread on the US short term rate
(FED3M) plus dummies and a measure of oil prices changes (BRENT).
Table 1
Equation 1: Emerging market spread and 3-month Fed Funds rate
Dependent Variable: DLOG(EMBISPREAD)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1992:03 1999:09
Included observations: 91 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.020 0.012 -1.646 0.103
DLOG(1+FED3M/100) 13.332 6.037 2.208 0.029
CRISIS 0.215 0.037 5.767 0.000
DLOG(BRENT(-1)) -0.253 0.129 -1.960 0.053
R-squared 0.297 Mean dependent var 0.006
Adjusted R-squared 0.273 S.D. dependent var 0.129
S.E. of regression 0.110 Akaike info criterion -1.539
Sum squared resid 1.048 Schwarz criterion -1.429
Log likelihood 74.01 F-statistic 12.28
Durbin-Watson stat 1.624 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
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The short term rate effect is clearly significant even when controlling for financial
crises and oil prices hikes. More interestingly, in the second equation we show that
there is a significant asymmetric effect in the role of the US short term rate variable. In
fact the coefficient for a rate increase is much more significant than for the simple rate,
while the coefficient for a rate decrease is almost insignificant, even if it retains the
right sign.
Equation 2: Emerging market spread and 3-month Fed Funds rate asymmetric effect.
Dependent Variable: DLOG(EMBISPREAD)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1992:03 1999:09
Included observations: 91 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.040 0.017 -2.404 0.018
DLOG(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0) 24.819 8.903 2.788 0.006
DLOG(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)<0) -5.352 12.292 -0.435 0.664
CRISIS 0.217 0.037 5.880 0.000
DLOG(BRENT(-1)) -0.249 0.128 -1.951 0.054
R-squared 0.321 Mean dependent var 0.006
Adjusted R-squared 0.289 S.D. dependent var 0.129
S.E. of regression 0.108 Akaike info criterion -1.551
Sum squared resid 1.012 Schwarz criterion -1.413
Log likelihood 75.58 F-statistic 10.18
Durbin-Watson stat 1.696 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
The result is important in the present setting, since most analysts expect a rise in short
term instruments in the US and Europe: according to the above result, such interest rate
hike ought to be transmitted also to emerging market debt instruments. We have
allowed for this asymmetric effect also in the disaggregated analysis and found it
equally significant.
3.2 DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS: BRADY BONDS SPREADS FOR THE MAJOR 7
ISSUERS.
The aggregated analysis of the previous paragraph does not allow to insert measures of
creditworthiness in the equation since creditworthiness is an idiosyncratic
phenomenon. Save for contagion effect, the credit worth or default probability must be
appreciated at the level of a single country. From the aggregated analysis we have
nevertheless a number of suggestions that we want to test at the individual country
level.
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In order to do so we have to produce in the first place a measure of credit worth or
default probability at the country level. Previous studies have used either a series of
indicators of economic fundamentals (e.g. Min [18]) or a series of ratings expressed by
major agencies like Moody’s or S&P (e.g. Kamin and von Kleist, [15]). We do not
want to enter into the problem of assessing whether agency rating or fundamentals are
better indicators of credit worth than direct use of indicators (see page 8). In our own
work we have found that ratings and fundamentals are strictly correlated and that a
valuable measure of country risk can be obtained by calibrating a function of macro
fundamentals to a restricted classification derived from Moody’s ratings. In practice we
have restricted the 16 categories given by Moody’s to 5 classes according the
following table:
Table 2
Assignment of numerical values to bond ratings
Numerical value    Moody’s
5    Aaa
4    Aa1, Aa2, Aa3
3    A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3
2    Ba1, Ba2, Ba3
1    B1, B2, B3
We have then used an ordered probit specification, using a sample of 74 countries, to
construct an index of country risk according to the following regression equation:
IR= Lf (INFL, GDPPC, CAEXP, DEFGDP, INT3M, DEBT)13,
where IR means index of risk and Lf stands for a linear function of:
GDPPC: per-capita income in dollars, as a measure of the state of the economic
development; as the per capita income increases, we expect a rise in the probability to
belong to the less risky class.
INFL: yearly inflation rate; the presence of high inflation as a sign of an incorrect
economic policy implies greater risk for the economy considered. This variable should
then present negative coefficient.
                                                            
13 The equation is fully reported in Appendix 1.
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CAEXP: the current account-exports ratio points out possible external unbalances as a
function of the hard currency revenues deriving from the exports; positive coefficient.
DEFGDP: nominal fiscal balance-GDP ratio, signalling the general quality of the
economic policy; negative coefficient.
INT3M: real three-months interest rates, whose high level is to be interpreted as a sign
of low financial stability. As such it presents negative coefficient.
DEBT: binary variable (dummy) which takes value 1 for countries that present a public
debt-GDP ratio over 80% or external debt-GDP ratio over 60% and 0 for the others; for
this dummy too we expect a negative coefficient.14
The variables considered in the model specification are those usually found in the
above studies. We checked the stability of the coefficients on a selected number of
dates of Moody’s releases. We then computed the value of the index for every month
of the sample and further normalised the index to the interval 0-1 by using a logit
transformation. We then used this constructed variables in the sequel: they are bounded
by 0 and 1 by the logit transformation. They appear as near unit processes. We do not
interpret them as integrated variables and carry on the analysis specifying a conditional
ECM between spreads and our index of macro-economic conditions.
At the disaggregated level we consider 7 countries that represent the main issuers of
Brady Bonds. They include 4 Latin American countries - Mexico, Argentina, Brazil
and Venezuela -, two eastern European – Bulgaria and Poland - and the Philippines.
The countries form an unbalanced panel, since we have less observations for Poland,
Bulgaria and Brazil, which start in 1995. The overall sample goes from 1992.01 to
1999.10: we have thus 530 unbalanced observations.
We now explore the properties of the panel with a LSDV specification.15
                                                            
14 See Hardy and Pazarbasioglu [13] as an example of works in which is used a set of variables of regional
relevance; in particular the authors apply bank crisis indicators to the analysis of the Asian crisis.
15 We are aware of the shortcomings and possible biases of using the LSDV specification on time series
cross section panels of inadequate length. We have 8 years of monthly observations: relying on
Montecarlo evidence reported by many authors and most recently by Judson and Owen [14], ours can be
regarded as an adequate sample. However we also are aware of the problems of heterogeneity raised by
Pesaran, Smith and  Im [20]. On this aspect we have relied heavily on a battery of Wald test, not always
reported in the main body of the paper, that give us some confidence that slope heterogeneity is not a
major problem of our specification. In fact we found an extremely homogenous set of coefficients even
when estimating the fully disaggregated version of the panel. We do not consider the newer tests on
cointegrated panels since we do not accept the hypothesis that spreads are integrated.
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In order to appraise the  correlation of our proposed measure of country risk we first
consider the static specification between spreads and individual country risk.
Results are in Table 3: they show a strong negative association (as expected) of our
index with the spreads; such association is clearly present in the data controlling for the
crises. Individual effects are remarkably close.
Of course the above equation is badly specified: dynamics is absent, residuals show
strong positive autocorrelation, other variables that we already found significant in the
aggregate index are also missing.
Table 3
 Static LSDV specification
Dependent Variable: LOG(SPREAD)
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Sample: 1992:01 1999:10
Included observations: 94
Number of cross-sections used: 7
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 530
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LOGIT(IR) -1.149 0.176 -6.529 0.000
CRISIS 0.267 0.054 4.976 0.000
Fixed Effects
MEX--C 6.73
ARG--C 7.06
BRA--C 6.70
VEN--C 7.03
POL--C 6.03
BUL--C 7.15
PHI--C 7.00
R-squared 0.893 Durbin-Watson stat 0.148
Adjusted R-squared 0.891
S.E. of regression 0.423
A more complete LSDV specification is the following (Table 4), where we have
imposed the restriction that the long run coefficient between the spreads and the risk is
one. The Wald test for such restriction gives:
F-statistic 0.5899 Probability 0.4428
Chi-square 0.5899 Probability 0.4424
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Examination of the coefficients of the equation shows that the process of adjustment to
the fundamentals is rather slow. Only 10% of the distance from the equilibrium value
is eliminated in the current month. On the other hand it is confirmed also at the
individual country level that there is a significant impact effect of international rates.
Oil price is significant with the expected negative sign since a number of the countries
included are important oil producers. This last result is open to question, given that the
sign is right for oil producing countries but it could be opposite for oil importing
countries. The sample is dominated by countries like Mexico and Venezuela that are
oil producers, but includes other countries like Bulgaria and the Philippines which are
not. The assumption can be tested removing the restriction of the common coefficient
for the oil price variable.
Table 4
 Dynamic LSDV specification
Dependent Variable: DLOG(SPREAD)
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Sample: 1992:03 1999:10
Included observations: 92
Number of cross-sections used: 7
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 517
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
DLOG(SPREAD(-1)) 0.158 0.041 3.864 0.000
D(LOGIT(IR)) -0.354 0.122 -2.898 0.004
LOG(SPREAD(-1))+ LOGIT(IR(-1)) -0.079 0.014 -5.655 0.000
DLOG(BRENT(-1)) -0.194 0.061 -3.197 0.001
CRISIS 0.172 0.018 9.340 0.000
DLOG(1+FED3M/100) 0.563 0.190 2.962 0.003
Fixed Effects
MEX--C 0.51
ARG--C 0.52
BRA--C 0.51
VEN--C 0.54
POL--C 0.43
BUL--C 0.53
PHI--C 0.52
R-squared 0.264 Mean dependent var -0.006
Adjusted R-squared 0.247 S.D. dependent var 0.157
S.E. of regression 0.136 Sum squared resid 9.326
Log likelihood 319.05 F-statistic 36.24
Durbin-Watson stat 1.921 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
The CRISIS variable can be similarly tested for heterogeneity. Finally, the hypothesis
of asymmetry in the effect of international short rates that was apparent in the
aggregate EMBI equation can also be tested.
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In order to pursue a better understanding of the basic model we have followed the
strategy of specifying it as a system of regression equations estimated by WLS. We
have then tested  heterogeneity and asymmetry with a battery of Wald tests. In the last
step the equation has been estimated with SUR.
The final result of such specification strategy is reported in the following table. It
deserves a number of comments, to facilitate the interpretation it may be useful to refer
to part b) of the table looking to coefficient codes.
Coefficients C(8) to C(14) are fixed effect coefficients. We have nothing to observe
save that they are remarkably close to each other indicating that there should be no
other identifiable idiosyncratic effects in the country risk premia beyond those
envisaged by the equation.
Table 5
SUR specification with asymmetry and individual country effects
a) estimated coefficients and standard errors
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1992:03 1999:10
Included observations: 92
Total system (unbalanced) observations 517
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
C(1) 0.181 0.043 4.222
C(2) -0.149 0.086 -1.734
C(3) -0.085 0.015 -5.734
C(4) -0.259 0.081 -3.216
C(5) 0.166 0.028 5.887
C(6) 18.24 5.645 3.231
C(7) -2.088 0.925 -2.256
Fixed effects:
C(8) 0.54 0.10 5.41
C(9) 0.56 0.10 5.37
C(10) 0.54 0.10 5.36
C(11) 0.57 0.10 5.44
C(12) 0.57 0.10 5.43
C(13) 0.46 0.09 5.15
C(14) 0.57 0.11 5.28
Coefficient C(1) and C(2) are the short run adjustment parameters for the dependent
and risk index variables.
Coefficient C(3) measures the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium vector.
Coefficient C(1), C(2) and C(3) contribute to the dynamic process of adjustment of
spreads to the country index of credit worth. Since in our metric the long run parameter
is unity, a 1% change in credit worth is ultimately translated in 1% change in spreads.
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b) country equations
Equation: DLOG(SPREADMEX) = C(8) + C(1)*DLOG(SPREADMEX(-1)) +
         C(2)*D(LOGIT(IR_MEX)) + C(3)*(LOG(SPREADMEX(-1)) + LOGIT(IR_MEX(-1)) +
         C(4)*DLOG(BRENT(-1)) + C(5)*CRISIS  +  C(6)*D(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0)
Observations: 92
R-squared 0.327 Durbin-Watson stat 2.038
Adjusted R-squared 0.279
Equation: DLOG(SPREADARG) = C(9) + C(1)*DLOG(SPREADARG(-1)) +
        C(2)*D(LOGIT(IR_ARG)) + C(3)*(LOG(SPREADARG(-1)) + LOGIT(IR_ARG(-1)) +
        C(4)*DLOG(BRENT(-1)) + C(5)*CRISIS + C(6)*D(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0)
Observations: 76
R-squared 0.339 Durbin-Watson stat 1.904
Adjusted R-squared 0.282
Equation: DLOG(SPREADBRA) = C(10) + C(1)*DLOG(SPREADBRA(-1)) +
           C(2)*D(LOGIT(IR_BRA)) + C(3)*(LOG(SPREADBRA(-1)) + LOGIT(IR_BRA(-1)) +
           C(4)*DLOG(BRENT(-1)) + C(5)*CRISIS + C(6)*D(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0)
Observations: 52
R-squared 0.399 Durbin-Watson stat 2.116
Adjusted R-squared 0.319
Equation: DLOG(SPREADVEN) = C(11) + C(1)*DLOG(SPREADVEN(-1)) +
        C(2)*D(LOGIT(IR_VEN)) + C(3)*(LOG(SPREADVEN(-1)) + LOGIT(IR_VEN(-1)) +
        C(4)*DLOG(BRENT(-1)) + C(5)*CRISIS + C(6)*D(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0)
Observations: 92
R-squared 0.329 Durbin-Watson stat 1.637
Adjusted R-squared 0.282
Equation: DLOG(SPREADPHI) = C(12) + C(1)*DLOG(SPREADPHI(-1)) +
        C(2)*D(LOGIT(IR_PHI)) + C(3)*(LOG(SPREADPHI(-1)) + LOGIT(IR_PHI(-1)) +
        C(6)*D(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0) + C(7)*DLOG(CRB)
Observations: 92
R-squared 0.157 Durbin-Watson stat 1.873
Adjusted R-squared 0.108
Equation: DLOG(SPREADPOL) = C(13) + C(1)*DLOG(SPREADPOL(-1)) +
        C(2)*D(LOGIT(IR_POL)) + C(3)*(LOG(SPREADPOL(-1)) + LOGIT(IR_POL(-1)) +
        C(5)*CRISIS + C(6)*D(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0)
Observations: 56
R-squared 0.231 Durbin-Watson stat 2.252
Adjusted R-squared 0.154
Equation: DLOG(SPREADBUL) = C(14) + C(1)*DLOG(SPREADBUL(-1)) +
        C(2)*D(LOGIT(IR_BUL)) + C(3)*(LOG(SPREADBUL(-1)) + LOGIT(IR_BUL(-1)) +
        C(5)*CRISIS + C(6)*D(1+FED3M/100)*(D(FED3M)>0)
Observations: 57
R-squared 0.163 Durbin-Watson stat 1.840
Adjusted R-squared 0.081
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Chart 4
Residuals of SUR system
Residuals are reasonably well behaved; around 1997 there is short span where a
common overestimation of the spreads indicates that the model does not account
completely for the sharp reduction in spreads after the Mexican crisis. Residuals
also appear to exhibit some volatility, however we did not found significant
ARCH effects except for Mexico.
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Numerical values are such that approximately 14% of the permanent change happens
in the same month, 75% within one year and 95% in two years.
Coefficient C(4) refers to the oil price variable. It is not significant for Poland, Bulgaria
and the Philippines and it has been excluded from these country equations.
Coefficient C(5) refers to the common effect of international crises. It is not significant
and it has been excluded from the Philippines equation.
Coefficient C(6) test the asymmetric effect of international short term rate. It is highly
significant. The symmetric coefficient for negative variations of the same rate is
insignificant (t-ratio=0.5) and has been excluded from the equation.
Coefficient C(7) refers to an index ex-oil of commodities, the CRB index. It is
significant only for the Philippines, which is an important food producer.
Coefficients (C4) for oil price, C(6) for international rates and C(7) for food prices,
reflect transient phenomena.
The fit of individual equations is not poor, averaging 30%; it appears somewhat better
for Latin American countries. Residuals are well behaved (see Chart 4), they display
some volatility which is however significant only for Mexico according to a LM(3)
test.
Numerical values of the estimated coefficients imply a non marginal role for macro
fundamentals. Let’s illustrate it using data for Mexico.
Chart 5 graphs the behaviour of the actual spread for Mexico and two simulated series
given by the results of a dynamic simulation over the entire period, using as values for
the index of risk those corresponding to the range of the actual series. For Mexico the
range goes from a minimum of 0.14 to a maximum of 0.48 with median value 0.33.
The two simulated series are obtained in correspondence to the two extreme values
kept constant.
The average distance between the two bands is approximately 200 basis points. Such is
then the range of variation of the spreads that can be attributed to changes in risk rating
in the case of Mexico. From the graphs one sees that the actual spread wanders in and
out of the corridor reverting to it. Similar values hold for the other countries of the
panel.
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Chart 5
The spread for Mexico: the role of fundamentals
4. CONCLUSIONS
We take four main conclusions from the above empirical analysis. First, we have found
a significant role in the behaviour of spreads for an indicator of macro fundamental
conditions. Spreads tend to adjust to macro fundamentals with a rather long lag,
however we estimate that 75% of the adjustment takes place in the same year.
Second, we have found that spreads are significantly affected by shock factors. We
have isolated a role for commodity prices: interestingly, oil producing countries benefit
from oil prices hikes and, similarly, food producing countries from the dynamics of the
CRB index, which contains a large number of agricultural products and soft
commodities.
Third, and this seems to constitutes a novel result, we have found a significant
asymmetric effect for international rates. The result may help explain the contradictory
evidence that has been reported in the literature: the sensitivity of spreads appears
greater in the case of an upturn in international rates, possibly in anticipation of
balance-of-payments difficulties. This asymmetric effect is also important for its
potential implications for the asset allocation activity. The “appetite for risk”
hypothesis seems instead refused by our model, confirming the conclusions of much
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literature about the little role for the loose monetary stance in industrialised countries
on the decline of the spreads in 1996-1997. More convincingly the phenomenon seems
to be attributed, as previously mentioned, to the longer-term process of globalisation in
financial markets that has favoured a diversification of which the emerging markets
have benefited.
Fourth, in examining the data we have matured the opinion that equations like ours and
those similar reported in the literature are not apt to explain or predict the insurgence of
crises in emerging market. Crises arise for other factors rather than a bad state of
fundamentals and once they have started they spread to other countries16. In our
equation, in order to isolate the role of fundamentals, we have neutralised the effect of
crises by using a rather rough dummy variable that obviously mimics the
interdependence. However the interdependence and  contagion problems are important
and cannot be studied by dummies alone: they obviously deserve further work and
possibly a different econometric technique.17
                                                            
16 See Calvo [1] and Fernández -Arias [10].
17 An interesting recent strand of literature considers the distinction between interdependence and
contagion effect in the analysis of the transmission of financial crises. (Forbes-Rigobon [11]  ).
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DATA APPENDIX
Dependent Variables
RATINGS: Sovereign credit ratings were taken from Moody’s Investors Service.
SPREADS: Sovereign spreads were collected from J.P. Morgan’s web site (http://
www.morganmarkets.com). They refer to the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI),
which is a total-return index of U.S. dollar denominated Brady bonds and other
sovereign restructured bonds.
Dummy Variables
CRISIS: it takes value 1 in coincidence with periods of major financial crises, 0
otherwise.
Solvency Variables
DEFGDP: ratio of nominal fiscal deficit to GDP; sources: OECD, DRI, IFS.
DEBT: dummy variable which takes value 1 if public debt/GDP is over 80% or
external debt/GDP is over 60%, 0 otherwise; sources: OECD, BIS, IIF, IFS.
Macroeconomic Fundamentals
INFL: yearly inflation rate; sources: DRI, IFS.
GDPPC: per-capita income; sources: DRI, IFS.
CAEXP: current account-exports ratio; sources: DRI, IFS.
INT3M: real three-month interest rates; sources: Bloomberg, IFS.
External Factors
BRENT: nominal price of oil (US$ per barrel).
CRB: Commodity Research Bureau Index (spot price of commodities ex-oil).
FED3M: three-month Fed Funds rate.
Countries considered in the probit regression are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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APPENDIX 1: THE ORDERED PROBIT EQUATION FOR REPLICATING
MOODY’S  RATINGS
A1.1 The ordered probit equation
As explained in the text, in order to gauge the importance of fundamentals in the
spread equation of our panel, instead of using a number of economic condition
indicators we have resorted to a summary measure offered by the index function of an
ordered probit equation. The equation cited in the text is the following:
Dependent Variable: IR
Numerical value      Moody’s
5      Aaa
4      Aa1, Aa2, Aa3
3      A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3
2      Ba1, Ba2, Ba3
1      B1, B2, B3
Method: ML - Ordered Probit
Included observations: 74 - Period  1998.Q1
Number of ordered indicator values: 5
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
GDPPC 0.0001 2.E-05 5.6683 1.E-08
INFL -0.0301 0.0102 -2.9565 0.0031
CAEXP 1.2456 0.5991 2.0792 0.0376
DEBT -0.8594 0.3552 -2.4193 0.0156
DEFGDP -6.3527 3.3153 -1.9161 0.0553
INT3MRC -0.1032 0.0446 -2.3160 0.0206
Limit Points
LIMIT_1:C(7) -1.9061 0.5377 -3.5448 0.0004
LIMIT_2:C(8) -0.4132 0.4358 -0.9480 0.3431
LIMIT_3:C(9) 1.5623 0.5181 3.0154 0.0026
 LIMIT_4:C(10) 3.3045 0.6729 4.9110 9.E-07
Akaike info criterion 2.0226 Schwarz criterion 2.3339
Log likelihood -64.834 Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.1468
Restr. log likelihood -114.10 Avg. log likelihood -0.8761
LR statistic (6 df) 98.539 LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.4318
Probability(LR stat) 0.0000
Variables are defined in the Data Appendix.
Note: country variables  corresponding to  INT3MC have been censored at 0 and 12%.
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A1.2 Time series properties of the rating variables
We have constructed measures of credit worth for the individual countries as a linear
combination of the macro-variables, using as weights the coefficients of the probit
equation. We have then normalised the resulting series with a logit transformation. As
a result, our measure of country risk (called LOIR) is bounded between zero and one.
The time series properties of the resulting variable are somewhat mixed. ADF statistics
reported in Table A2 indicate that they can be seen as near integrated processes
(namely AR(1) with large autoregressive parameter). It is well known that ADF
statistics are unreliable when the series are likely to contain level shifts. We believe
this to be the case. We identify as level shift effects the changes in creditworthiness of
the country induced by changes in the fundamentals.
Table A2
 ADF statistics for the measure of country risk (LOIR)
Country Test equation.: d(yt)=c1 + c2yt(-1) + c3yt(-1)) + ut
Mexico -2.174 1%   Critical Value* -3.502
5%   Critical Value -2.892
Argentina -4.761 1%   Critical Value* -3.502
5%   Critical Value -2.892
Venezuela -2.473 1%   Critical Value* -3.502
5%   Critical Value -2.892
Brazil -2.311 1%   Critical Value* -3.562
5%   Critical Value -2.919
Poland -3.800 1%   Critical Value* -3.550
5%   Critical Value -2.913
Bulgaria -1.291 1%   Critical Value* -3.503
5%   Critical Value -2.893
Philippines -2.656 1%   Critical Value* -3.502
5%   Critical Value -2.892
The assumption of stationarity for these variable is reinforced by the following panel
regression:
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Table A3
Panel estimation of the DF equation of the seven countries
Dependent Variable: D(LOIR)
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Sample: 1992:03 1999:10
Included observations: 92
Number of cross-sections used: 7
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 566
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LOIR -0.124 0.019 -6.503 0.000
D(LOIR(-1)) 0.072 0.041 1.738 0.083
Fixed Effects
ARG--C 0.059
BRA--C 0.016
VEN--C 0.027
MEX--C 0.041
PHI--C 0.103
POL--C 0.055
BUL--C 0.025
R-squared 0.073 Mean dependent var 0.003
Adjusted R-squared 0.059 S.D. dependent var 0.048
In the following chart we show the time series profile of the series. One can see clear
level shifts in most of the series:
Chart A1
Stacked line graph of the country risk measures
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